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REVIEW ARTICLE
Aleksandra Čavoški, PhD*
THE IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT OF BREXIT
Abstract: Following the referendum held on 23 June 2016, the UK Government, in 
accordance with Article 50 TEU, notified the president of the European Council of 
its intention to leave the European Union. The decision of the UK to leave the EU 
known as “Brexit” has presented both the EU and the UK with complex challenges. 
While it is almost impossible to predict and assess all the effects of Brexit, the author 
will identify in this short overview the most important challenges facing both parties 
to the negotiations, as well as assess the wider implications of Brexit on future EU 
enlargement. The effects of Brexit in the UK are much deeper and long-lasting than 
in the EU. These include deepening political and social cleavages, economic effects 
and the need for comprehensive legal reform. Despite the initially gloomy prospects 
about the future of the European Union, the EU gradually reaffirmed its authority 
among member states and returned to ‘business as usual’. With regard to the wid-
er impact of Brexit, these difficulties undoubtedly have already had a discouraging 
effect on any other member state who may have contemplated leaving the EU. Like-
wise, Brexit brought member states more closely together and exposed the impor-
tance and value of the EU project. This is particularly significant for the accession 
countries that over time have diminishing interest in EU membership due to the 
lengthy and demanding accession process.
Key words: Brexit, impact, United Kingdom, European Union, enlargement, 
Western Balkans.
. Introduction
Following the referendum held on 23 June 2016,1 the UK Govern-
ment, in accordance with Article 50 TEU, notified the president of the Eu-
ropean Council of its intention to leave the European Union.2 This marked 
* Senior Lecturer, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom
 e-mail: a.cavoski@bham.ac.uk
1 Leave – 51.9% and remain 48.1%; Turnout was very high at 72.2%.
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the beginning of lengthy and difficult negotiations which are still ongoing 
at the time of writing. The decision of the UK to leave the EU known as 
“Brexit” has presented both the EU and the UK with complex challenges. 
While it is almost impossible to predict and assess all the effects of Brexit, 
the author will attempt in this short overview to identify the most impor-
tant challenges facing both parties to the negotiations, as well as to assess 
the wider implications of Brexit on future EU enlargement. The paper will 
show that the effects of Brexit in the UK are much deeper and long-lasting 
than in the EU. These include deepening political and social cleavages, 
economic effects and the need for comprehensive legal reform. Despite 
the initially gloomy prospects about the future of the European Union, the 
EU gradually reaffirmed its authority among member states and returned 
to ‘business as usual’. With regard to wider impacts of Brexit, in particular 
on the enlargement process, the paper will argue that though the effects 
of Brexit are gradually diminishing, the EU is firmly committed to build-
ing a stronger sense of shared values among its current and prospective 
members.
. The Impact of Brexit on the EU
The impact of Brexit on the EU has varied over the time. Immediately 
after the referendum in the UK there was a widespread feeling that Brexit 
exposed the fragility of the European project. It was also seen as a major 
blow to the future of European integration. This was not surprising as the 
2016 referendum and the subsequent decision of the UK Government to 
trigger the Article 50 TEU came at a time when the European political 
landscape was already coloured by the ongoing migration crisis, internal 
and external security concerns resulting from terrorist threats and grow-
ing Euroscepticism. As Brack and Costa argued, “Euro-scepticism became 
an integral part of the political landscape of most member states” and the 
EU institutions had to moderate their pro-European discourse.3 Moreo-
ver, the decline of public support for European Union was particularly no-
ticeable in three big member states, including UK, Germany and France.4 
In addition, post-recession austerity had an important effect on electorates 
across the EU. Some countries such as Greece were still recovering from 
3 Brack, N., Costa, O., 2012, Beyond the Pro/Anti-Europe Divide: Diverging Views of 
Europe within EU Institutions, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 104. 
See more in Čavoški, A., 2015, Idealism or Realism in the Process of EU Enlargement 
– the Case of Serbia, East European Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 265–289.
4 Medrano, J. D., 2012, The Limits of European Integration, Journal of European Inte-
gration, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 192. 
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the economic downturn in 2008. Brexit was thus seen as another crisis 
that would divert political and institutional resources from addressing the 
normal functioning of the EU. There were also concerns that Brexit would 
render preferences of member states more acute.5
However, despite initial predictions of the collapse of the EU 
post-Brexit, its effects on the EU have been less severe than was initial-
ly expected. To paraphrase Mark Twain, initial reports of the EU’s death 
were greatly exaggerated. There is no doubt that EU had to act prompt-
ly after the referendum results and affirm its authority among member 
states. The first step was to reiterate the importance and the value of the 
EU project. In September 2016, EU leaders met at the European Council 
in Bratislava with the aim of addressing the immediate effects of Brex-
it.6 The sense of urgency was evident from the language of the Bratislava 
Declaration. Leaders emphasized the critical time for the European pro-
ject and the need to “diagnose together the present state of the European 
Union and discuss our common future”.7 Most importantly, EU leaders 
emphasised in subsequent policy documents that, despite the UK’s deci-
sion to leave the EU, the EU still remains indispensable for all remaining 
member states.8 As this was a sovereign decision, the EU confirmed its 
respect of the British decision to leave the Union. However, it was im-
portant to impress upon member states that, although it was a regrettable 
decision, it should not affect the future of the EU.9 The need to address 
political climate in the EU was also recognised in the Bratislava Decla-
ration10 and subsequent policy documents pointing at populist parties 
taking advantage of this political climate.11 EU leaders acknowledged the 
extreme or populist political forces and their impact on citizens through 
use of “simplistic solutions”, as well as the need for the EU to work with its 
5 See Čavoški, A., 2015, pp. 269–272.






9 The 2017 President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address (https://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17–3165_en.htm) p. 9 and the 2018 State of the Un-
ion: The Hour of European Sovereignty (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/be-
ta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf) p. 9.
10 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21250/160916-bratislava-declara-
tion-and-roadmapen16.pdf at p. 2.
11 See Brande, L. van den, 2017, Reaching out to EU Citizens: A New Opportunity “About 
us, with us, for us”, European Commission 2017, pp. 10–14 (https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/publications/reaching-out-eu-citizens-new-opportunity_en).
440 |
PRAVNI ZAPISI • Godina X • br. 2 • str. 437–452
citizens and regain their trust.12 These challenges were further echoed in 
the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe which opened the 
discussion on possible pathways for future European integration.13
The EU also faced significant diversion of its institutional resources 
to Brexit. In July 2016 just three month after the referendum, it was decid-
ed that the Commission would lead the negotiations on behalf of the EU 
and, to that end, the Commission Taskforce for the Preparation and Con-
duct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 of the 
TEU was set up.14 President Juncker appointed Michel Barnier as Chief 
Negotiator responsible for leading the Taskforce.15 Though it is difficult 
to identify costs of negotiations with the UK including the opportunity 
costs of diverted resources,16 the scope of the mandate of the Taskforce 
is good illustration of the breath of the task entrusted to the Commission. 
Besides regularly holding negotiation rounds, preparing and drafting ne-
gotiations documents,17 the Commission embarked on a complex ‘Brexit 
preparedness’ journey which involved the following activities: Commis-
sion departments had to issue series of preparedness notices outlining 
how their work will be affected by Brexit; the Commission had to propose 
legislative and non-legislative measures to ensure the robust institutional 
framework post-Brexit; the Commission had to provide national Brexit 
information in member states and to ensure the protection of rights of UK 
citizens living in the EU.18
As a part of the EU’s negotiating strategy, EU officials had to ad-
dress the wider impact that Brexit may have had on member states with 
strong Eurosceptic sentiment. A choice was made to adopt a negotiating 
strategy that would be discouraging for countries contemplating leav-
12 The Bratislava Declaration (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21250/160916-bra-
tislava-declaration-and-roadmapen16.pdf) p. 2. General and specific challenges were 
identified in the Roadmap. See also President Juncker’s Opening statement in the Eu-
ropean Parliament plenary session “A New Start for Europe” (http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-14–567_en.htm).





16 Some costs are available in the 2018 Annual Report (https://ec.europa.eu/info/pub-
lications/annual-activity-report-2018-taskforce-article-50-negotiations-united-king-
dom_en).
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ing.19 Moreover, negotiations had to demonstrate the primacy EU plac-
es on the preservation of the single market. It was clear from the start 
that the UK’s cherry-picking approach would not be acceptable to the 
EU and it would not accept any sectoral agreements that could jeop-
ardise the unity of four freedoms. The UK Government was hoping for 
a bespoke financial agreement that would be particularly important in 
preserving the status of the City of London.20 This proposal was firmly 
rejected by the EU. It had similar hopes in reaching a bespoke custom 
agreement with the EU that will not bound UK to follow the common 
external tariffs while at the same time allowing the UK to negotiate sep-
arate trade deal with other countries.21 Another important feature of 
the Commission’s negotiation strategy was to demonstrate solidarity to 
existing member states. The best example is the EU’s insistence on the 
preservation of the Irish backstop despite the strong opposition by the 
UK. To that end, it was important to demonstrate that UK is about to 
become a third country and the EU needs to preserve the interests of its 
members in the negotiation process.
. The Impact of Brexit on the UK
The decision to leave the EU presented the UK with an unprecedent-
ed range of challenges, including political, social, economic and legal chal-
lenges. Most importantly, the political division among leading parties and 
badly managed negotiation process left the nation deeply divided between 
what are known as “Brexiters” and “remainers” leading to the creation of 
a hostile and xenophobic environment. This division affected all walks of 
life as well as all levels of governance. The devolved nations, in particular 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, who voted against Brexit, found them-
selves side-lined and their interests not taken into account in post-Brexit 
referendum decision making. As the prospect of no-deal with the EU has 
increased, Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon launched discussion 
about alternative options for Scotland which involve a second independ-
ence referendum.22 The deep political cleavages around Brexit have been 
particularly damaging for the two main political parties, Labour and Con-
19 See more about negotiations in Patel, O. The EU and the Brexit Negotiations: Institu-
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servatives. No less important is the impact on Brexit on British civil ser-
vice, which is well respected for its impartiality, professionalism and nego-
tiations skills. Civil servants have been asked to dismantle the structures 
they have been building for forty years and put in place a future regulatory 
regime with limited resources and great political uncertainty.
While the British economy has yet to be deeply affected by Brexit 
nearly all forecasts predict that Brexit will harm the UK economy.23 The 
immediate effect after the 2016 referendum was a decrease in the value 
of sterling.24 As sterling depreciation increased the price of imports, par-
ticularly food and fuel, this in turn led to increased inflation, an aggregate 
increase of nearly 2 percent in the year following the referendum.25 By 
November 2017 inflation had reached 3.1%, missing the Bank of Eng-
land target.26 This has affected household spending, initially due to the 
increased cost of household essentials such as food and later due to wider 
uncertainty around Brexit.27 The uncertain atmosphere has also affected 
business investment, with investment decreasing since the referendum.28 
Wider economic activity has also been affected. In September 2019 the 
Purchasing Managers’ Index, widely regarded as a barometer of economic 
activity, was at a seven-year low.29 As a globalised economy with close 
integration into European supply chains, the UK has much to lose from a 
disorderly Brexit. The car industry has been particularly vocal about the 
threat of a no deal Brexit on UK manufacturing. BMW, for example, has 
already moved some production out of the UK.30 The most significant 
uncertainty surrounds whether the UK will leave with a deal in January 
2020 or later. A no deal would have a profoundly disruptive impact on 
the UK economy, as well as severe long-term effect on public finances and 
economic growth.31 Thus, while the full economic effects of Brexit are yet 
23 Institute for Government. (https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/
files/Economic%20impact%20of%20Brexit%20summary.pdf).
24 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36611512
25 Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy, D., Sampson, T., 2017, The Brexit Vote, Inflation 
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to be fully understood, the forecasts predicting harm to the UK economy 
will almost certainly be vindicated.
Brexit has presented the UK with complex legal challenges. These 
challenges in particular will have a discouraging effect on any member 
states who may wish to leave the EU in the future. Despite its decision 
to leave the EU, the UK decided to retain EU law including, as the EU 
Withdrawal Act states, “EU-derived domestic legislation” and “direct EU 
legislation”.32 Although this decision may seem as an oxymoron, it is cer-
tainly a reasonable approach if the UK intends to continue trading with 
EU member states. The retention of “EU-derived domestic legislation” is 
less complex as the UK has already over the years incorporated EU law 
which is not directly applicable and it forms part of the existing corpus 
of national law. A more demanding task was the passing of new laws and 
regulations necessary to incorporate “direct EU legislation” which, due to 
its legal nature, has not been previously transposed in UK legislation. This 
required an initial comprehensive assessment of EU directly applicable 
legislation, mostly including EU regulations and a subsequent drafting of 
national legislation. However, this is just the first stage of this process of 
retaining EU law. The next and more demanding task will be to regularly 
update national legislation in line with amendments adopted at the EU 
level. The UK Government will have to put in place a process which will 
allow for continuous monitoring of the development of EU law and its 
subsequent incorporation into UK law. This automatic process of updat-
ing legislation may prove to be challenging in future. As the UK will no 
longer be a part of the decision-making process after leaving the EU, it 
will become less familiar with the reasons and objectives for passing cer-
tain legislation, which is often important in understanding the best ways 
to implement legislation. This will be particularly challenging in areas of 
law which are heavily based on science and technology where understand-
ing the context for passing a piece of legislation may be very important.
Related to this question is the status of EU courts’ case law in the 
UK post-Brexit. According to section 6(1) of the Withdrawal Act, a court 
or tribunal shall not be bound by any decisions made by the European 
Court on or after the exit day. A national court or tribunal may still have 
regard to post-Brexit judgments of CJEU “so far as it is relevant to any 
matter before the court or tribunal”.33 This may create a complex legal 
situation whereby the EU law is embedded into UK law but UK courts 
are not bound by EU courts’ case law post Brexit which has an impor-
32 Section 2 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act (https://services.parliament.uk/
bills/2017–19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html).
33 Section 6(2) of the Withdrawal Act.
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tant role in further interpreting and clarifying EU law. This is not to say 
that European courts’ case law delivered after the exit day may not have 
persuasive force in UK courts which will ultimately depend on individual 
judges and their views on the importance of relevant CJEU case law as 
well as their willingness to follow the development of EU case law post 
Brexit. However, if a judge decides not to rely on CJEU case law adopted 
after Brexit with regard to the interpretation of UK law deriving from EU 
law, this may lead to wrongful interpretation and application of domestic 
law based on EU law.
Following the retention of EU law, the UK is presented with a chal-
lenge of replicating the regulatory regimes that exist at the EU level.34 This 
will require not only putting in place new institutions and resources, but 
also designing new administrative processes and rules. Some of the best 
examples will entail the transfer of powers vested to the European Chem-
icals Agency, European Food and Safety Agency and the European Medi-
cines Agency to national authorities. For example, the European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA) is the main regulatory authority entrusted with powers 
to manage and facilitate compliance with EU legislation on chemicals.35 
For example, the European Chemicals Agency is responsible for the im-
plementation of Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) which includes various technical, 
scientific and administrative aspects of REACH.36 Though the UK Gov-
34 See more in Heyvaert, V., Čavoški, A., UK Environmental Law Post Brexit, in: Dou-
gan, M., (ed.), 2017, The UK After Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges, Intersentia, pp. 
120–123.
35 Main legislation on chemicals: Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a 
European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Coun-
cil Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as 
well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 
93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC OJ L 396, 30.12.2006; Regulation (EC) No 
1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and 
repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1907/2006 (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 353, 31.12.2008; Regulation (EU) No 
649/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 concerning 
the export and import of hazardous chemicals (recast) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ 
L 201, 27.7.2012; Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use 
of biocidal products (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L, 167/1 27.6.2012.
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ernment plans to introduce a new regulatory framework that will operate 
in the same manner as the ECHA,37 the effects of Brexit on business is par-
ticularly alarming if no-deal is reached with the EU. Upon leaving the EU, 
there will be no requirement for the UK to align domestic rules with EU 
rules on chemicals. Moreover, as explained by ECHA, the authorisations 
granted to UK based companies will cease to be valid and those companies 
will not be entitled to sell into the EEA market.38 Thus, UK companies are 
advised to promptly transfer their application for authorisation or already 
granted authorisation to ‘an only representative’39 in the EU.40
. The Impact of Brexit on the Enlargement 
Process
The immediate impact of Brexit was much wider and extended be-
yond the EU and UK. Brexit was regarded as yet another crisis that EU 
had to address by deploying significant resources and time. After the UK 
referendum and triggering of Article 50 TEU, there were serious concerns 
about the implications of Brexit on future EU enlargement. It was not sur-
prising that in the 2016 EU Enlargement Policy, the Commission reiter-
ated serious challenges that the EU continues to face on various fronts, 
some of which have destabilising effects not only in Europe but also glob-
ally.41 In his 2017 State of Union Speech, Commission President Juncker 
stated that there will be no future enlargements during the term of the 
Commission appointed in 2014 as countries of Western Balkans are still 
not ready to join.42 Though this evaluation of the progress in those coun-




39 See Article 8 of REACH which prescribes that natural or legal person established 
outside the Community who manufactures a substance on its own, in mixtures or in 
articles, formulates a mixture or produces an article that is imported into the Com-
munity may by mutual agreement appoint a natural or legal person established in the 
Community to fulfil, as his only representative, the obligations on importers under 
this Title.
40 https://echa.europa.eu/uk-based-authorisation-holder-under-reach
41 The 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy COM(2016) 715 final, p. 2 
(https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20161109_strate-
gy_paper_en.pdf).
42 The 2017 State of the Union Address available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_SPEECH-17–3165_en.htm, pp. 6–7.
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in light of the ongoing Brexit discussions. Brexit was at the time a major 
distraction from further European integration and this decision demon-
strated the need to ensure that European integration is seen as an attrac-
tive and prosperous path by potential members.43 Moreover, immediately 
after Brexit the EU had to divert its attention from any enlargement dis-
cussions to preparing for a smooth exit of one of the largest EU member 
states. From an early start the negotiation process proved to be challeng-
ing as the parties failed to agree on some crucial issues, including the UK’s 
trading status, the rights of EU citizens and Irish border. This was further 
exacerbated by the lack of preparedness of the UK Government and a di-
vision between political parties on those key issues.
Despite the immediate difficulties surrounding Brexit negotiations 
that impacted enlargement policy, in time the severity of these effects 
on the EU has gradually diminished. This is best evidenced by series 
of policy documents that the Commission issued from 2018. Of key 
significance is the 2018 Western Balkans Strategy ‘A Credible Enlarge-
ment Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western 
Balkans’ which confirms the European perspective of this region and 
the countries’ prospect of membership.44 The Western Balkans, both in 
terms of its geographical position and shared history, forms an integral 
part of Europe which has already benefitted from the EU accession pro-
cess.45 This process has helped countries in the region to achieve po-
litical, economic and social progress.46 The commitment to strengthen 
cooperation to the Western Balkans and provide support within the 
43 In its 2016 EU Enlargement Policy, the Commission emphasised that the “attractive-
ness of the EU in the enlargement countries has been partly affected by the economic 
downturn and scepticism regarding the European project”, p. 2 (https://ec.europa.eu/
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20161109_strategy_paper_en.pdf). 
44 The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions: ‘A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with 




lege-read-out-present-western-balkans-strategy_en. In her remarks at the college 
read-out to present the Western Balkans Strategy, Federica Mogherini reiterated that 
Western Balkans are part of Europe geographically, but this region also shares the 
same history as the members of the European Union, the same cultural heritage, the 
same challenges, the same interests, the same opportunities. She also stated that she 




Aleksandra Čavoški, Th e Implications and Impact of Brexit
accession process was further emphasised in the 2019 EU Enlargement 
Policy,47 the 2018 Western Balkans summit in London48 and the 2019 
Western Balkans summit in Poznan49.
However, the language of policy documents on enlargement still sig-
nals the underlying impact of Brexit on enlargement, as well as the cu-
mulative effect of all crises that affected the stability of the EU in the last 
decade. There is no doubt that a robust and merit-based system represents 
the cornerstone of a credible enlargement policy. As stated in the Western 
Balkans Strategy, this approach is “in the Union’s very own political, secu-
rity and economic interest”.50 With the exception of 1995 enlargement,51 
previous waves of enlargement led to the accession of states which were 
less economically developed. Thus, the EU wants to ensure that all sub-
sequent enlargements have minimum effect on the functioning of the EU. 
The emphasis is on making the Union stronger and more solid, before it 
becomes bigger again.52 This entails not only the political and econom-
ic stability of the EU subsequent to any new enlargement, but also the 
joint commitment of all member states to the EU project that becomes 
an underlying value. The lack of joint commitment to further enlarge-
ment was recently evidenced by the statement of French president Macron 
calling for the reform of the enlargement process53 and the decision of 
the European Council to “revert to the issue of enlargement before the 
EU-Western Balkans summit in Zagreb in May 2020”.54 This latter point is 
also closely related to Brexit and member states such as Hungary and Italy 
which experienced strong anti-European sentiment within the governing 
elite. Brexit demonstrated how those Eurosceptic views and populist views 
can play an important role in national elections.
Building this sense of shared values is particularly important in West-
ern Balkans countries which have been torn apart by the ethnic conflict 
and may easily be affected by populist agendas. Moreover, the potential 
impact of Russia in Serbia as the biggest country of the Western Balkans 





50 COM(2018) 65 final, p. 1 (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf).
51 In 1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden joined.
52 COM(2018) 65 final, p. 2.
53 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50100201
54 European Council Conclusions 17 and 18 October 2019 (https://www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/media/41123/17–18-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf).
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is another important consideration.55 In its 2018 State of Union Speech 
Juncker reflected on this point by saying that unless the EU acts in this 
region, it will be shaped by others.56 The 2018 Western Balkans Strate-
gy clearly reiterates that joining the EU is a choice and it is a place for 
new members only if there is a “political and societal consensus and the 
support of the hearts and minds of the people”.57 Moreover, leaders in ac-
cession member states should have a clear idea of what EU project entails 
and this needs to be clearly “reflected in leaders’ communications and out-
reach to citizens”.58 This is a clear reference to Brexit in several important 
ways. It shows that each country enjoys sovereignty but sovereignty shall 
be diminished upon joining the EU. Thus, the country has to ensure that 
the EU membership is a choice endorsed by both citizens and politicians. 
Sending a clear message about what EU membership entails was seriously 
lacking in the UK Brexit debate and unfortunately had an impact on the 
final vote at the referendum. Moreover, it deeply divided the nation with-
out any prospects of bringing people together in the near future. Thus, the 
accession countries have a political and moral obligation to provide truth-
ful and comprehensive information about the membership.
. Conclusion
At the time of writing, it is yet not known what the final outcome of 
Brexit will be and what form Brexit will take. Despite some initial chal-
lenges that EU faced, EU institutions are ready for the UK’s departure. 
This is not the case with the UK which is presented with major political, 
economic and social difficulties resulting from Brexit. With regard to the 
wider impact of Brexit, these difficulties undoubtedly have already had a 
discouraging effect on any other member state who may have contemplat-
ed leaving the EU. Likewise, Brexit brought member states more closely 
together and exposed the importance and value of the EU project. This 
is particularly significant for the accession countries that over time have 
diminishing interest in EU membership due to the lengthy and demand-
ing accession process. Though the enlargement process will still remain 
a highly technocratic and merit-based process, Brexit demonstrated the 
55 Serbia signed the Free-trade Pact with the Eurasian Economic Union in October 2019, 
(https://astanatimes.com/2019/10/eurasian-economic-union-serbia-sign-free-trade-
agreement/).
56 The 2018 State of Union Speech, p. 4 (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/be-
ta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf).
57 COM(2018) 65 final, p. 3.
58 COM(2018) 65 final, p. 3.
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UTICAJ I POSLEDICE BREGZITA
Aleksandra Čavoški
REZIME
Posle referenduma od 23. juna 2016. godine, shodno članu 50 Ugovo-
ra o Evropskoj uniji, Vlada Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva obavestila je predsed-
nika Evropskog saveta o svojoj nameri da napusti Evropsku uniju. To je 
obeležilo početak dugih i teških pregovora koji se još uvek vode u vreme 
kada se ovo piše. Odluka Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva da napusti EU, poznata 
kao „Bregzit“, suočila je EU i UK sa složenim izazovima. Iako je skoro 
nemogućno da se predvide i procene sve posledice Bregzita, autor je na-
stojao da u ovom kratkom prikazu utvrdi najvažnije izazove s kojima su 
suočene obe strane u pregovorima, kao i da proceni šire posledice Bregzita 
za buduća proširenja EU. Posledice Bregzita u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu 
su mnogo dublje i dalekosežnije nego u EU. Ovo uključuje produbljivanje 
političkih i društvenih raskola, ekonomskih posledica i potrebu za sveo-
buhvatnom pravnom reformom.
Uprkos sumornim predskazanjima o budućnosti EU i početnim iza-
zovima s kojima je ona bila suočena, EU je uspela da iznova potvrdi svoj 
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autoritet među državama članicama i vrati se „svakodnevnim poslovima“. 
Evropska unija je takođe spremna za izlazak Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva. U 
pogledu širih posledica Bregzita, teškoće s kojima se Ujedinjeno Kraljev-
stvo i dalje suočava deluju obeshrabrujuće na svaku državu članicu koja 
možda razmišlja o napuštanju EU. EU je i dalje čvrsto posvećena stvara-
nju jačeg osećanja zajedništva koje prihvataju kako sadašnji tako i budu-
ći članovi. Isto tako, Bregzit je zbližio države članice i naglasio vrednost 
uspostavljanja EU i članstva u ovoj supranacionalnoj organizaciji. Ovo je 
naročito važno za zemlje kandidate za pristupanje koje su tokom vremena 
smanjile interesovanje za članstvo u EU, zbog dugog i zahtevnog postupka 
prijema. Iako će postupak proširenja ostati izuzetno složen i zasnovan na 
pojedinačnom napretku svake zemlje kandidata, Bregzit je ukazao na po-
litičke, društvene, ekonomske i bezbednosne prednosti članstva u EU za 
zemlje koje traže prijem.
Ključne reči: Bregzit, uticaj, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, Evropska unija, pro-
širenje, Zapadni Balkan.
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